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Production and conflict models versus rent-seeking models 
Kjell Hausken
A production and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one 
group, two groups and K groups. Adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but 
causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model. The total 
production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within-group and 
between-group decisiveness. Productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role. 
The collective action problem is more severe for the RS model. As group size increases, the 
ratio of within-group to between-group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the 
P&C model, while it increases convexly for the RS model. Adding an additional agent to each 
of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in RS groups than in P&C groups, while adding 
a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result. The 
severe between-group fighting in the P&C model for many groups causes the P&C model to be 
preferable for few groups, while the RS model is preferable for many groups. Applications are 
considered to intergroup migration, inside versus outside ownership, divestitures, mergers and 
acquisitions, multidivisional versus single-tier firms and U form versus M form of economic 
organization.
1. Introduction
The production and conflict literature1 and the rent-seeking literature2 
continue to grow and blossom. In the former, each agent allocates his 
resource between production and fighting. In the latter each agent fights for 
an external fixed rent. This article compares the two models systematically 
for agents in one group, two groups, and K equally large groups. Within-
group and between-group fighting, and utilities, differ for the two models 
dependent on within-group and between-group decisiveness, group sizes, 
production and fighting efficiencies, and the sizes of the resource and rent. 
Comparison is necessary since the differing assumptions of the models have 
differing im-plications which may induce framing effects. Applications are 
considered to intergroup migration, inside versus outside ownership, 
divestitures, mergers and acquisitions, multidivisional versus single-tier 
firms and U form versus M form of economic organization.
The production and conflict literature emerges to extend the focus on 
production and consumption in economic theory. Grossman (1991), 
Hausken (2004), Hirshleifer (2001), Skaperdas (1992) and others argue that 
in addition to producing commodities, agents may appropriate goods 
produced by others. Typically two or many unitary agents in one group are 
considered. Hausken (2000a,b) extends to agents in two groups. This article 
develops a richer model where each agent allocates his resource into 
fighting3 within his group, fighting between groups and production. This 
accounts separately for two levels of conflict, and for production.
Early contributions to the rent-seeking literature are by Krueger (1974), 
Posner (1975), Tullock (1967), reviewed by Nitzan (1994). There is no 
production, but the agents fight for an external fixed rent. Katz, Nitzan and 
Rosenberg (1990) and Nitzan (1991a,b) extend to two and n groups, 
respectively, known as collective rent seeking. As Garfinkel (2004) notes, 
the approach typically “treats the two levels of conflict as one,” where “each 
member’s contribution to his respective group’s effort in the inter-group 
conflict jointly determines the outcome of both that conflict and the intra-
group conflict.” Exceptions are Bös (2002), Garfinkel (2004), Inderst, 
Müller and Wärneryd (2002), Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), Müller and 
Wärneryd (2001) and Wärneryd (1998). This article is related to the 
exceptions but is more general. It accounts for both within-group and 
between-group decisiveness which determines within-group and between-
group distribution.
The similarities between production and conflict (P&C) models and rent-
seeking (RS) models are considerable. Both models focus on conflict as 
such, between agents and between groups. The objective of each agent is a 
maximum share of either the total production or the rent. The within-group 
and between-group decisiveness, which determines distribution of 
production or rent within and between groups, play a role in both models. 
The group sizes and the number of groups of course also play a role in both 
models. To reach his objective each agent must fight in both models, and 
this article makes a distinction between fighting within a group, and fighting 
between groups. The within-group and between-group fighting efficiencies 
play a role in both models. In the P&C model each agent also has an interest 
in production, since if no one produces, each gets zero utility. In the RS 
model there is no production, but each agent is concerned about how large a 
cost of rent seeking to incur. Collectively it would be beneficial to incur low 
cost of rent seeking (fighting). If no one fights, the first to fight negligibly 
gets the en-tire rent. Hence some degree, and often a considerable degree, of 
fighting occurs.
The differences between the models should also be outlined. The P&C 
model applies for agents and groups (firms, enterprises, divisions, institutions, 
collectivities, etc.) involved in production. The rent or prize from predatory 
activity is not given but is an endogenous result of the agents’ productive 
activities. Similarly, the cost function for predatory activity is not given, 
but represents the productive activity foregone. There is thus a productive 
tradeoff between predatory activity and consumption goods. Endogenizing 
the rent implies that “overdissipation” always occurs, i.e., since fighting is
Pareto-inefficient, the agents would always do better in aggregate never 
engaging in it. Adding a new agent means adding a new producer, but also a 
new fighter who fights within and between groups for the total production. 
Similarly, adding a new group means adding a new group of producers, who 
fight within and between groups. The size of the pie to be shared thus 
increases with the number of productive agents. The size of the resource and 
the productive efficiency are thus essential. The focus in the P&C model is 
on how an agent allocates his resource between production and fighting 
(appropriation). A typical result is that an agent with low productive 
efficiency may allocate a larger fraction of his resource to fighting.
The rent-seeking (RS) model applies for agents and groups involved in
rent seeking. The rent or “aggregate revenue” is exogenously given, and the
cost function is suitably specified. Summing over all agents, this implies that
the aggregate costs incurred may well exceed the value of the rent. Hence the
“paradox of overdissipation” as widely discussed in the RS literature. Adding
a new agent means adding a new rent seeker or fighter, who is not involved
in production, but fights within and between groups for the rent which gets
shared with yet another agent. Similarly, adding a new group means adding a
new group of rent seekers, who fight within and between groups for the rent.
The size of the pie to be shared is thus fixed and essential. The focus is on
the rent-seeking efforts of each agent, and whether the rent gets dissipated by
rent seeking. Examples of rents are competition for budgets by interest groups
(parties, localities, industries, etc.), struggles for government support between
different industries, an R&D budget, promotion and election opportunities,
government allocation of public goods such as sanitation, and employment
and welfare opportunities.
The similarities and differences between P&C models and RS models 
raise concern about how the models are applied to various phenomena. 
Understanding the underlying logic of the two models is imperative as a 
basis for interpreting results in various application areas. The article 
demonstrates what it is in the inherent logic of P&C models and RS models 
that generate different results. It is shown how and why the Nash equilibria 
differ in the two models. Care should be exercised to avoid that too far- 
reaching conclusions are made in various application areas without 
explicating the different premises of the two models.
Six applications are considered. For intergroup migration Hausken’s 
analysis (Hausken, 2000b) of a P&C model is contrasted with the RS model. 
For inside versus outside ownership, Mu¨ller and Wa¨rneryd’s analysis of a RS 
model (Mu¨ller & Wa¨rneryd, 2001) is generalized and contrasted with the P&C 
model. The same is done for mergers and acquisitions. For divestitures, multi-
divisional versus single-tier firms, and U form versus M form of economic 
organization, Inderst et al.’s analysis of a RS model (Inderst et al., 2002) is 
generalized and contrasted with the P&C model.
The next section presents the P&C model for one group, two groups, and K
equally large groups. The section that follows does the same for the RS model.
The suceeding three sections compare the P&C model and RS model for one
group, two groups, and K equally large groups. Last few sections consider the
six applications. The final section concludes. Appendix C extends the P&C
model dynamically.
2. A Production and Conflict Model
First consider one group with size n1. As formulated by Hirshleifer (1995a:30)
and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997:102), agent i in group 1 has a resource
R1 transformable into two kinds of efforts. The first is productive effort Ei de-
signed to generate production from resources currently controlled. The second
is fighting effort Fi designed to acquire the production of others, or repel others
as they attempt to do the same. With unit conversion costs a1 and b1 of trans-
forming R1 into Ei and Fi , we get R1 = a1 Ei +b1 Fi . Assume a simple produc-
tion function where agent i produces (R1 − b1 Fi )/a1, and the group produces∑n1
i=1(R1−b1 Fi )/a1.4 The agents fight with each other with within-group deci-
siveness m1. Agent i gets a ratioFm1i /
∑n1
i=1 F
m1
i , known as the contest success
function (Hirshleifer, 2001; Skaperdas, 1996; Tullock, 1967), and utility
Ui = F
m1
i∑n1
i=1 F
m1
i
n1∑
i=1
R1 − b1 Fi
a1
. (2.1)
Second consider two groups with sizes n1 and n2. As in the one-group model,
agent i in group k has a resource Rk transformable into productive effort Eki
and fighting effort. One innovation in this article is to distinguish between two
kinds of fighting effort. The first is fighting effort Fki within group k, where
agent i fights with decisiveness mk with all the other agents within group k
for a largest possible ratio of group k’s ratio of the production. The second is
fighting effort Gki , where all the agents in group k compile their efforts into
a group fighting effort (∑nki=1 Gki )m directed against the other group to obtain
a largest possible ratio of the total production, where m is the decisiveness of
between-group fighting.5Formally, where ak, bk, ck are unit conversion costs,
agent i in group k divides his resource Rk into three kinds of effort:
Rk = ak Eki + bk Fki + ck Gki , i = 1, . . . , nk, k = 1, 2. (2.2)
ck operates as bk , but transforming into between-group effort instead of within-
group effort.1/ak, 1/bk, 1/ck are the efficiencies. The production function for
agent i in group k is
Yki = Eki = (Rk − bk Fki − ck Gki )/ak . (2.3)
The total production [∑n1i=1 Yk1 +
∑n2
i=1 Yk2 ] is placed in a common pool for
capture.6 Each agent is involved in two independent fights to get a largest
possible ratio of the total productions.7 In the one fight agents in both groups
choose G1i and G2i independently to maximize utility, taking the other agents’
genitive; choices of G1i and G2i , and all choices of F1i and F2i , as given. The
fighting effort for group k is (∑nki=1 Gki )m . Applying the ratio formula gives
(
nk∑
i=1
Gki
)m/[( n1∑
i=1
G1i
)m
+
(
n2∑
i=1
G2i
)m]
to group k. Multiplying this ratio with the total production gives group k’s
utility. In the other fight agents in both groups choose F1i and F2i indepen-
dently to maximize utility, taking the other agents’ choices of F1i and F2i , and
all agents’ choices of G1i and G2i , as given. As in the one-group game, agent
i’s objective is to obtain a largest possible ratio of group k’s utility. He thus
gets a ratioFmkki /
∑nk
i=1 F
mk
ki , which is multiplied by the previous group ratio
and the total production to give his utility, i.e.
Uki = F
mk
ki∑nk
i=1 F
mk
ki
( ∑nk
i=1 Gki
)m
[( ∑n1
i=1 G1i
)m + ( ∑n2i=1 G2i
)m]
×
[
n1∑
i=1
R1 − b1 F1i − c1G1i
a1
+
n2∑
i=1
R2 − b2 F2i − c2G2i
a2
]
. (2.4)
Third consider K groups with equal group sizes n. Agent i in group k has a
resource R = aEki + bFki + cGki transformable into productive effort Eki ,
within-group fighting effort Fki , and between-group fighting effort Gki , with
efficiencies 1/a, 1/b, 1/c. The production function for agent i in group k is
Yki = Eki = (R − bFki − cGki )/a. The total production
∑K
k=1
∑n
i=1 Yki
is placed in a common pool for capture. The n agents in group k fight as a
collective against all the agents in the K – 1 other groups. W.l.o.g. we analyze
agent i in group 1, with fighting efforts F1i and G1i . All agents in groups
2, . . . ,K choose equal fighting efforts F2 and G2. The ratio formula gives
(
n∑
i=1
G1i
)m/[(
n∑
i=1
G1i
)m
+ (K − 1)(nG2)m
]
to group 1. Analogously to Equation (2.4), agent i’s utility in group 1 is
U1i = F
m1
1i∑n
i=1 F
m1
1i
( ∑n
i=1 G1i
)m[ ∑n
i=1
R−bF1i −cG1i
a
+ (K − 1)n R−bF2−cG2
a
]
(∑ni=1 G1i )m + (K − 1)(nG2)m
(2.5)
3. A Rent-Seeking Model
First consider a rent-seeking model for one group with size n1.8 Agent i has
a resource ri which is exclusively transformed into rent-seeking (fighting)
fi with unit conversion cost b1. Hence ri = b1 fi , which is a cost incurred.
As in the P&C model the agents fight with each other with within- group
decisiveness m1, where agent i gets a ratio f m1i /
∑n1
i=1 f m1i of the rent S.
Agent i’s utility is9
ui = f
m1
i S∑n1
i=1 f m1i
− b1 fi . (3.1)
Second consider two groups with sizes n1 and n2. Agent i in group k has a
resource rk = bk fki +ck gki , i = 1, . . . , nk, k = 1, 2, where bk and ck are unit
conversion costs, transformable into two kinds of rent-seeking (fighting). The
first is fighting effort fki within group k, where agent i fights with decisiveness
mk with all the other agents within group k for a largest possible ratio of group
k’s ratio of the rent S, determined by f mkki /
∑nk
i=1 f mkki . The second is fighting
effort gki , where all the agents in group k compile their efforts into a group
fighting effort (∑nki=1 gki )m directed against the other group to obtain a largest
possible ratio of the total rent S, determined by
βk =
(
nk∑
i=1
gki
)m/[( n1∑
i=1
g1i
)m
+
(
n2∑
i=1
g2i
)m]
wnere m is the decisiveness of between-group fighting. The agent incurs a cost
bk fki of within-group fighting, and a cost ck gki of between-group fighting.
Analogously to the P&C model, agent i’s utility in group k is
uki = f
mk
ki∑nk
i=1 f mkki
( ∑nk
i=1 gki
)m S
[( ∑n1
i=1 g1i
)m + ( ∑n2i=1 g2i
)m] − bk fki − ck gki . (3.2)
Third consider K groups with equal group sizes n. Agent i in group k has
a resource r = b fki + cgki and incurs a cost b fki of within-group fighting
and a cost cgki of between-group fighting, with efficiencies 1/b, 1/c. W.l.o.g.
we analyze agent i in group 1, with fighting efforts f1i and g1i . All agents
in groups 2, . . . , K choose equal fighting efforts f2 and g2. The ratio formula
gives
(
n∑
i=1
g1i
)m/[(
n∑
i=1
g1i
)m
+ (K − 1)(ng2)m
]
Figure 1. Variables for one group as functions of group size n1, adding one group member.
to group 1. Analogously to Equation (3.2), agent i’s utility in group 1 is
u1i = f
m1
1i∑n
i=1 f m11i
( ∑n
i=1 g1i
)m S
[( ∑n
i=1 g1i
)m + (K − 1)(ng2)m
] − b f1i − cg1i . (3.3)
4. Comparing the One-Group Production and Conflict Model and Rent-
Seeking Model
For the one-group production and conflict model (P&C model) the FOC 
∂Ui /∂ Fi = 0 g ives the Ui = U and Fi = F listed in rows 2 and 3 in the left 
column of Table 1, where identical agents behave equivalently in equilibrium. 
Increasing group size n1 or decisiveness m1 causes more fighting F and lower 
utility U . F increases toward a horizontal asymptote in n1 and m1,enabled 
by production. There is diminishing return to investment into fighting as n1
or m1 increases. U decreases toward zero in n1 and m1, which appear mul-
tiplicatively in the denominator. See Figure 1 (for m1 = 1) and Figure 2 (for 
n1 = 5), where a1 = b1 = R1 = S = 1. Rows 5, 6 and 7 show the impact of 
adding an extra agent to the group, expressed as n1 + 1. This causes 
increased fighting Fn1+1 at a smaller rate as n1 or m1 increases, where Fn1+1/
Fn1 decreases toward 1 in n1 and m1. I t also causes decreased utility Un1+1, 
where Un1+1/Un1 increases toward 1 in n1 and decreases toward (n1 − 1)/n1
in m1. Adding an agent when the decisiveness m1 is large is more detrimental 
to the utility Un1+1 than adding an agent when the group is already large. In a 
group with low decisiveness m1, each agent finds low fighting and high 
production optimal since production is distributed in an egalitarian manner. 
As m1 increases, production distribution becomes less egalitarian, and fight-
ing increases, diminishingly since some production is needed to generate 
utility.
Table 1. Equilibrium variable solutions for the one/two-group P&C model and RS model
Production and conflict model Rent seeking model
(Continued on next page)
Table 1. (Continued )
Production and conflict model Rent seeking model
(Continued on next page)
Table 1. (Continued )
Production and conflict model Rent seeking model
Figure 2. Variables for one group as functions of decisiveness m1, adding one group member.
For the one-group rent seeking model (RS model) the FOC ∂ui/∂ fi = 0
gives the ui = u and fi = f listed in rows 2 and 3 in the right column of
Table 1. The collective action problem is more detrimental in the RS model.
Whereas adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, it causes
the fixed size pie S to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model.
Hence utility u1 decreases more severely toward zero in n1 in the RS model.
When m1 = 1, u1 decreases with 1/n21 while U1 decreases only with 1/n1
in the P&C model. Correspondingly, fighting f decreases with (n1 − 1)/n21
approaching zero, caused by the constraint of the fixed sized rent, while it
increases diminishingly in the P&C model, approaching a positive constant.
The detrimental collective action problem induces each agent to reduce his
cost of fighting f to avoid low utility. Hence in Figure 1, fn1+1/ fn1 increases
toward 1 in n1, while Fn1+1/Fn1 decreases toward 1 in n1. Fighting f increases
linearly and utility u decreases linearly in the decisiveness m1, in contrast to
the steeper but diminishing increases and decreases for F and U in the P&C
model, see Figure 2.10 The reason is each agent’s interest to keep bounds on
his cost of fighting f to ensure high utility in the RS model.
5. Comparing the Two-Group Production and Conflict Model and Rent-
Seeking Model
For the two-group P&C model the FOCs (Appendix A) imply the solution
in Table 1. For the two-group RS model calculating ∂u1i/∂ f1i = 0 and
∂u2i/∂ f2i = 0, calculating ∂u1i/∂g1i = 0 and ∂u2i/∂g2i = 0 and equating
the two equivalent square brackets, and letting all agents in group k incur
equal rent-seeking cost gki = gk in equilibrium causing uki = uk gives the
solution in Table 1. The expressions for group 2 are found by permuting the
indices.
Table 1 allows for a detailed comparison of the two models dependent on
variation in the 14 parameters n1, n2, m, R1, R2, S, m1, m2, a1, a2, b1, b2, c1
and c2. An exhaustive analysis would take us beyond the space constraints of
this article. We choose to selectively consider variation in group size n1 = n2
and between-group decisiveness m, with some subsequent discussion.
For the second of the two expressions in Table 1, where
m1 = m2 = a1 = a2 = b1 = b2 = c1 = c2 = 1, R1 = R2, within-group fighting
F1 approaches a constant as n1 increases for the P&C model. In contrast,
f1 decreases by 1/n1+2m1 , i.e. even more severely than in the one-group RS
model. The difference is more pronounced for the utilities. U1 decreases by
1/n1, while u1 decreases by 1/n2+2m1 . The collective action problem grows
more severe in the two-group RS model due to the fixed-sized S allocated
on an additional group, Figures 3–6 set R1 = R2 = S = 1. Figure 3 illustrates
for m = 1, where f1 decreases, F1 increases marginally toward a constant
and u1 decreases more severely than U1. The logarithm to base 10 of the
variables is chosen along the vertical axis to account for the considerable
differences.
For between-group fighting the difference is even more dramatic. G1
approaches a constant as n1 increases for the P&C model. In contrast, g1
decreases by 1/n3+2m1 . Taking the ratio of within-group to between-group
Figure 3. Variables for two groups as functions of group size nk = n1 = n2.
Figure 4. Variables for two groups as functions of nk = n1 = n2, adding one group member.
Figure 5. Comparing the variables for two groups and one group as functions of nk = n1 = n2.
fighting, F1/G1 increases marginally toward a constant as n1 increases, while
f1/g1 increases quadratically in n1, see Figures 3, 7 and 8. Whereas within-
group and between-group fighting are comparably sized for the P&C model,
between-group fighting is negligible compared with within-group fighting in
Figure 6. Variables for two groups as functions of between-group decisiveness m.
Figure 7. The ratio F1/G1 as function of K and n for m = m1 = a = b = c = 1.
Figure 8. The ratio f1/g1 as function of K and n for m = m1 = b = c = 1.
the RS model, e.g., n1 = n2 = 10 gives F1/G1 = 18/19 and f1/g1 = 180. 
That agents in the RS model cut back so severely on between-group fighting 
g1 illustrates a free-rider problem for each agent in the collective conflict with 
the other group. No agent takes on a noticeable burden g1 of bringing home 
a ratio of the rent S to his group, but takes on some burden f1 to ensure a 
personal ratio of his group’s ratio of the rent. The distinction between the two 
levels of conflict gives a more explicit account of Olson’s observation of free-
riding (Olson, 1965) in a large group, and of the similar observation in the 
collective rent-seeking literature where the two levels of conflict are 
effectually considered as one, i.e, each agent free-rides in his collective fight 
g1 with the other group, while his fighting f1 with his fellow group members 
is more a tradeoff of getting a large ratio and avoiding costly within-group 
fighting.
Although free-riding is also there in the P&C model, it is not that 
detrimental. Whereas the RS model assumes a fixed external rent 
independent of the number of agents fighting for it, in the P&C model every 
new agent is a poten-tial, and in fact an actual, producer. A crucial question 
in the very fast grow-ing rent-seeking literature is whether the rent gets 
dissipated by rent-seeking. Table 1 shows that rent dissipation may easily 
happen giving negative u and uk for quite standard parameter values, when 
mk is a bit large, or m is a bit large. Adding another agent in a RS model is 
thus a considerable liability, perhaps reminiscent of adding another person 
to a sinking ship, where the fixed rent S is to be shared with yet another 
person. In the production and conflict literature the notion of “dissipation of 
production” or “dissipation of produced goods” has not been introduced, 
though authors have compared the lower utility with fighting with the higher 
utility without fighting. The utilities U and U1 in Table 1 are never negative, 
and they only approach zero asymptotically when the parameters take on 
extreme values. Adding another agent in a P&C model is also a liability, 
but a far smaller one since the new agent is also a producer.
 This is illustrated in Figure 4 where Uk∗/Uk for the P&C model lies above 
uk
∗/uk for the RS model. The * signifies that one agent is added. All the 
eight ratios in Figure 4 approach one asymptotically. The
decrease of F∗k /Fk toward one and increase of f ∗k / fk toward one have the
same explanation as for the one- group models.
We have observed that adding an additional agent to each of two groups is
more detrimental to the utilities in RS groups than in P&C groups. Adding a
second group of agents when there is already one group of agents, however,
gives the reverse result of being more detrimental to the utilities in P&C groups
than in RS groups. The short explanation is that G1 is much larger and costly in
the P&C model than is g1 in the RS model. More explicitly, in the RS model the
only focus of each agent is whether to fight internally ( f1) or externally (g1).
The rent is provided for free, like manna from heaven. There is no concern
where the rent comes from. It arrives mysteriously on the scene, and the
agents fight for it. They fight fiercely for it within each group. Adding another
group reduces the within-group fighting f1 and only marginally increases
the between-group fighting (g1 is low), which is beneficial. Agents are not
vulnerable for exploitation of something they have produced, since they do
not produce, and there is nothing in the other group that the agents want to
appropriate. The only focus of the agents is the fixed rent external to both
groups. In contrast, in the P&C model each agent has a third concern of
production (E1) in addition to fighting internally (F1) and externally (G1).
Without production the agents have nothing to fight for. The agents have to
produce (E1) to avoid zero utility. Production makes an agent vulnerable for
exploitation by other agents who may not produce. Hence each agent has
to fight internally (F1) with other agents in his group. However, if there is a
second group, agents also have to fight externally (G1) as a collective with this
group. We have shown that this external fighting G1 with the other group is
much fiercer than the external fighting g1 in the RS model, especially as group
size n1 increases, i.e., F1/G1 is close to unity while f1/g1 typically increases
convexly/dramatically in n1. In the P&C model, each agent prefers to acquire
something explicit in the other group, i.e. production or produced goods, and
prefers to avoid that agents in the other group acquire one’s own production.
Although the total production is placed in a common pool for capture, this
common pool is generated by each group, and is not external to the groups in
the sense that a rent is external. This generates a large G1.11 Figure 5 illustrates
the difference. For groups above a certain size the parameter values reduce
internal fighting to ca. 50% for both models when adding a second group. The
sizable and negligible between-group fighting G1 and g1 reduce the utilities
to 25% for the P&C model and 50% for the RS model.
Between-group fighting G1 and g1 increase, and utilities U1 and u1 de-
crease in the between-group decisiveness m. Within-group fighting F1 de-
creases while f1 decreases, is constant or increases in m, see Figure 6 where 
n1 = n2 = 5. Inspecting Table 1 reveals that the within-group decisiveness mk 
operates similarly in the two-group models and in the one-group models, as 
discussed under the section comparing the one-group production and conflict 
model and rent-seeking model. Although adding an agent or a group is never 
beneficial from an agent’s genitive point of view in the two models, 
reducing both the between-group and within-group decisiveness m and mk to 
zero, m = mk = 0, causes an agent in the P&C model to be indifferent w.r.t. 
adding an agent or a group. The reason is that all fighting ceases, G1 = F1 = 
0, and each agent can enjoy his own production Ek = Rk/ak undisturbed. In 
the RS model this is not the case. Although m = mk = 0 causes all fighting to 
cease, g1 = f1 = 0, adding an agent or a group inevitably gives a smaller 
ratio of the fixed sized rent to each agent. Increasing bk causes lower Fk and
fk , increasing ck causes lower Gk and gk and increasing ak causes lower pro-
duction Ek . Appendix A considers three corner solutions when mk, m and ak
take extreme values.
Table 2. Equilibrium variable solutions for the K-group P&C model and RS model
Production and conflict model Rent seeking model
6. Comparing the K-Group Production and Conflict Model and Rent-
Seeking Model
For the K -group P&C model the FOCs (Appendix B) imply the solution in
Table 2. For the K -group RS model calculating ∂u1i/∂ f1i = 0, ∂u1i/∂g1i = 0,
and setting f1i = f1, g1i = g1 in equilibrium causing uki = uk , gives
the solution in Table 2. Permuting the indices gives the group 2 ex-
pressions. Table 2 reduces to the one-group model in Table 1 when
K = 1, n = n1, a = a1, b = b1, c = c1. One group naturally gives G1 = g1 = 0.
Within-group fighting F1 and f1 decrease with 1/K for both models. Produc-
tion across all groups in the P&C model causes between-group fighting G1
to increase marginally in K toward a constant, while the fixed rent in the RS
model reduces g1 by 1/K . The ratio F1/G1 decreases by 1/K , while f1/g1
decreases toward a constant as K increases, as illustrated in Figures 7 and 8
as functions of the number K of groups and the number n of agents in each
group, where m = m1 = a = b = c = 1. The severe between-group fighting G1
in the P&C model for many groups has a detrimental impact on the utility U1
Figure 9. Variables for K groups as functions of the number K of groups, n = 5.
which decreases by 1/K 2 while u1 decreases by 1/K . This surprising effect
makes it more beneficial to raise the number K of groups in the RS model than
in the P&C model. Figure 9 illustrates where R = S = 1. With n = 5 agents in
each group, u1 is low in the RS model for K = 1 and K = 2, Figures 1 and 3.
As K increases, the utilities U1 and u1 become comparable for K ≈ 7 where
the curves cross, i.e., the P&C model is preferable for few groups, while the
RS model is preferable for many groups.
7. Intergroup Migration
Setting U1 = U2 and n1 + n2 = N for the P&C model, Table 1 implies
n1
n2
=
(
c2a1
c1a2
) m
m+1
, n1 = (c2a1)
m
m+1
(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
N ,
n2 = (c1a2)
m
m+1
(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
N . (7.1)
Consistent with the result of Hausken (2000b), n1/n2 decreases in the 
productive efficiency 1/a1, and increases in the between-group fighting 
efficiency 1/c1. Increasing m increases the group size disparity. Agents 
leave the group with high productive efficiency, and migrate to the group 
with high between-group fighting efficiency.
Setting u1 = u2 for the RS model, Table 1 implies
n1 A2(c1 A2)m
n2 A1(c2 A1)m
= (n1 − m)(c1 A2)
m + n1(c2 A1)m
(n2 − m)(c2 A1)m + n2(c1 A2)m . (7.2)
To facilitate analytical solution, inserting nk  m gives12
A1
A2
≈
(
c1
c2
) m
m+1
⇒
{
n1
n2
≈
(
c2
c1
) m
2m+2
when mk = 1,
n1
n2
≈
(
c2
c1
) m
m+1
when mk = 0
}
. (7.3)
With indecisive within-group fighting mk = 0 and equal productive 
efficiencies (a1 = a2), the two models operate equivalently. Within-group 
fighting is then dispensed with, and although between-group fighting differ, 
the group size ratio n1/n2 is the same. With decisive within-group fighting 
mk = 1, the ratio n1/n2 in Equation (7.3) is the square root of the ratio in 
Equation (7.1). Hence a superior between-group fighting efficiency 1/ck 
operates more efficiently in the P&C model, reducing the group size of the 
other group more severely than in the RS model. Production is generated 
within each group, while the rent is external to the two groups causing no 
group to be inferior or superior to the other with respect to production. 
Agents in an unproductive group focus strongly on between-group fighting, 
which has a detrimental effect on the productive group, causing more flight 
from the productive group, and hence smaller group size for the productive 
group than in a RS model with no differential production. Hence group sizes 
n1 and n2 tend to differ more in a P&C model than in a RS model.
8. Inside Versus Outside Ownership
If there is no outside owner, there is one group of n1 agents who only fight
one another. If there is an outside owner, there are two groups, and the n1
members of the firm fight the outside owner, which is a group with n2 agents,
as well as one another. To start simplistically, consider one outside owner, i.e.
n2 = 1, not involved in production, i.e. a2 = ∞ which implies E2 = 0 and
b2 F2 + c2G2 = R2. The total deadweight loss of fighting for the P&C model
is DO = n1(b1 F1 + c1G1) + n2(b2 F2 + c2G2).13 Inserting from Table 1 gives
Lim
a2→∞
n2→1
DO = Lim
a2→∞
n2→1
{n1(b1 F1 + c1G1) + n2 R2}
= Lim
a2→∞
n2→1
{
1
(m + 1)
[
a1(n1 − 1)m1
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
]
[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]
+a1m(c1a2)
m
m+1
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
]
(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
]
+ n2 R2
}
= n1(n1 − 1)m1 R1[1 + (n1 − 1)m1] +
mn1 R1
(m + 1)[1 + (n1 − 1)m1] + R2. (8.1)
For inside ownership the total deadweight loss of fighting is DI =
n1bF ,which when inserting F from Table 1 gives the first of the three terms
in Equation (8.1). Inside ownership is unconditionally preferable for the P&C
model, evidenced historically by the need for antitrust legislation.
This contrasts Mu¨ller and Wa¨rneryd’s claim that one outside owner (not
involved in production) is always preferable to inside ownership for rent-
seeking firms (Mu¨ller and Wa¨rneryd, 2001). Their observation is that outside
ownership, through adding a second level of conflict, mitigates distributive
conflict within firms. We have seen that this occurs through an unreasonably
high ratio f1/g1 of within-firm to between-firm fighting. Inserting from Table 1
the total deadweight loss dO of fighting under outside ownership for the RS
model is
dO = n1(b1 f1 + c1g1) + n2(b2 f2 + c2g2)
=
[
m1(n1−1)(c2 A1)m
n1
+ m2(n2−1)(c1 A2)m
n2
+ m(c1 A2)m (c2 A1)m [A1+A2][(c1 A2)m+(c2 A1)m ]
]
S
(c1 A2)m + (c2 A1)m . (8.2)
Inserting f from Table 1, the loss under inside ownership is dI =
n1b1 f |β1=1 = m1(n1 − 1)S/n1, where β1 = 1, since group 1 enjoys the
entire rent S. This gives advantage to outside over inside ownership when
dO − dI =
(c1 A2)m
[−m1(n1−1)
n1
+ m2(n2−1)
n2
+ m(c2 A1)m [A1+A2][(c1 A2)m+(c2 A1)m ]
]
S
(c1 A2)m + (c2 A1)m < 0, (8.3)
which when c1 = c2 = 1 simplifies to
m1(n1 − 1)
n1
− m2(n2 − 1)
n2
>
mn2m−22
[
n21 + n22
]
n21
[
n2m1 + n2m2
] . (8.4)
Hence outside ownership is preferable to inside ownership when the
within-firm decisiveness m1 in group 1 is large, and m is small or large which
reduces the RHS of Equation (8.4), and not intermediate. Hausken (2002a)
analyzes for general n1, n2, m2 and m. Equation (8.4) simplifies to Mu¨ller and
Wa¨rneryd’s inequality14 (Mu¨ller & Wa¨rneryd, 2001:533) when m2 = m = 1,
and to n21 > n1 + 1 when n2 = 1, which is always satisfied when n1 > 1,
favoring outside ownership for these parameter values.
9. Divestitures
For the P&C model, the total deadweight loss DD of fighting in two separate
firms is
DD = n1b1 F1D + n2b2 F2D = n1(n1 − 1)m1 R1[1 + (n1 − 1)m1] +
n2(n2 − 1)m2 R2
[1 + (n2 − 1)m2] , (9.1)
where Fk D is given by F in Table 1 for the two firms. Divestiture is preferable
when
DO − DD =
[a1(n1 − 1)m1 + a2(n2 − 1)m2]
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
]
(m + 1)[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]
+ m
[
a1(c1a2) mm+1 + a2(c2a1) mm+1
][
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
]
(m + 1)[(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
]
− n1(n1 − 1)m1 R1[1 + (n1 − 1)m1] −
n2(n2 − 1)m2 R2
[1 + (n2 − 1)m2] (9.2)
is positive, where inserting a1 = a2 gives
DO − DD = m[n1 R1 + n2 R2](m + 1)[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]
+{(n2 − 1)m2[1 + (n2 − 1)m2]n1 R1 + (n1 − 1)m1[1 + (n1 − 1)m1]n2 R2}[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2][1 + (n1 − 1)m1][1 + (n2 − 1)m2] ,
(9.3)
which is always positive favoring divestiture, as between-division fighting
is quite costly. This presupposes that the two newly created firms exist in
isolation from each other, e.g. by serving different markets, so that no costly
fighting occurs between the firms.
For the RS model, using Table 1, the total loss dD of fighting in two separate
firms is
dD = n1b1 f1 + n2b2 f2 = m1(n1 − 1)S
β(n1 + n2) +
m2(n2 − 1)S
β(n1 + n2)
= [m1(n1 − 1) + m2(n2 − 1)]S
n1 + n2 , (9.4)
where each firm k enjoys a rent βk S = nk S/(n1 +n2). Divestiture is preferable
when
dO − dD =
[[
m1(n1−1)
n1
− m2(n2−1)
n2
] [n2(c2 A1)m−n1(c1 A2)m ]
(n1+n2) +
m(c1 A2)m (c2 A1)m [A1+A2]
[(c1 A2)m+(c2 A1)m ]
]
S
[(c1 A2)m + (c2 A1)m] > 0,
(9.5)
which is satisfied when m1 = m2 and n1 = n2 since the first bracket in the
numerator equals zero. Comparable within-group decisiveness and sizes of
the two divisions justifies divestiture. Letting division 2’s size n2 approach
infinity, we have Limn2→∞ A2 = 0, and Equation (9.5) becomes
Lim
n2→∞
(dO − dD) =
[ (m1 − m2)n1 − m1
n1
]
Sβ > 0 when m1 >
m2n1
(n1 − 1) ,
(9.6)
Figure 10. Divestitures: dO − dD as a function of m1.
which is not satisfied when m1 = m2, compatibly with Inderst et al.’s 
analysis (Inderst et al., 2002). However, Equation (9.6) is satisfied when m1 
is somewhat larger than m2. More generally, the mathematical logic of the 
first two brackets in Equation (9.5) is such that dO − dD typically exhibits an 
in-verse U form, e.g. as a function of m1, see Figure 10. The inverse U shifts 
leftwards toward lower m1 as division 1’s size n1 increases, or m2 decreases. 
A large division size n1 is counterbalanced with a low within-group 
decisiveness m1 to justify divestiture. Increasing group size n1 exacerbates 
the public goods problem, reducing the expenditure on the interdivision 
conflict, unless the within-group decisiveness m1 is reduced accordingly to 
reduce the expenditure on the intradivision conflict.15
10. Mergers and Acquisitions
Consider two firms of sizes n1 and n2. Using for the P&C model the utilities
U = U1m (substituting n1 with n1 + n2) and U1 = U1nm from Table 1, an
agent in firm 1 prefers the merger if
U1m − U1nm = R1
a1[1 + (n1 + n2 − 1)m1]
−
(c2a1)
m
m+1
[
(c1a2)
m
m+1 + (c2a1)
m
m+1
]−1 ∑2
k=1
nk Rk
ak
(m + 1)n1[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2] > 0 ⇒
m1 <
R1[1 + (n2 − 1)m2]n1(m + 1)
[
(c1a2)
m
m+1 + (c2a1)
m
m+1
]
− a1
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
]
(c2a1)
m
m+1
a1
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
]
(c2a1)
m
m+1 (n1 + n2 − 1) − R1(n1 − 1)n1(m + 1)
[
(c1a2)
m
m+1 + (c2a1)
m
m+1
],
(10.1)
i.e. if the within-firm fighting after the merger is indecisive (m1 is low) or the
between-firm fighting before the merger is decisive (m is high).16
Using for the RS model the utilities u = u1m (substituting n1 with n1 + n2
and S with SM for monopoly rent) and u1 = u1nm , from Table 1 an agent in
firm 1 prefers the merger if
u1m − u1nm = n1 + n2 − m1(n1 + n2 − 1)(n1 + n2)2 SM
−
[ (n1 − m)(c1 A2)m + n1(c2 A1)m
n1[(c1 A2)m + (c2 A1)m]2
]
A1(c2 A1)m S > 0, (10.2)
where inserting m1 = m2, n1 = n2, c1 = c2 gives
m1 <
2n1
[
1 − (1 − m2n1
) S
SM
]
[(2n1 − 1) − 2(n1 − 1)
(
1 − m2n1
) S
SM
]
⇔ m > 2n1
(
1 − [2n1 − m1(2n1 − 1)]SM
2[n1 − m1(n1 − 1)]S
)
. (10.3)
If the RHS of the second expression in Equation (10.3) is negative, which
happens when the within-firm decisiveness m1 is large, an agent in firm 1 does
not prefer the merger. Figure 11 illustrates, assuming very small firm sizes
n1 = n2 = 2, SM = S. The curve for the P&C model approaches 1/(2(n1 − 1))
as m1 approaches infinity, which is a small number, especially as the firm size
n1 increases, suggesting frequent merger preference. In contrast, the curve for
the RS model increases convexly,and more so as the firm size n1 increases,
eventually approaching a vertical asymptote when the denominator on the
RHS of the right equation in Equation (10.3) equals zero, suggesting frequent
nonmerger preference. The differences between the models become more
pronounced when the firm sizes n1 = n2 increase. Figure 12 illustrates as a
function of m1.17,18
Figure 11. Mergers and acquisitions: P&C model versus RS model for n = 2, S = SM.
Figure 12. U1m − U1nm (P&C) and u1m − u1nm (RS) as functions of m; 5, 10, 1 means
n1 = 5, n2 = 10, m2 = 1.
11. Multidivisional Firms Versus Single-Tier Firms
The total cost of fighting in a multidivisional (MD) firm with K divisions and
n agents in each division is CP&C = K n[bF1 + cG1] for the P&C model. In
a single-tier (ST) firm with K n agents the cost is CP&Cs = K nbF . Inserting
from Tables 1 and 2 gives the difference
CP&C − CP&Cs = K n
[
K (n − 1)m1
[1 + (K − 1)m][1 + K (n − 1)m1] +
(K − 1)m
[1 + (K − 1)m]
− (K n − 1)m1[1 + (K n − 1)m1]
]
R. (11.1)
For the RS model the costs are CRS = K n[b f1 + cg1] and CRSs = K nbf , with
difference
CRS − CRSs = (K − 1)[m[n − m1(n − 1)] − m1n]SK n2 . (11.2)
Figure 13 illustrates as a function of K , where n = 5. The P&C model
typically favors the ST firm over the MD firm. The reverse is often the case for
the RS model, e.g., m = m1 causes CRS −CRSs to be negative, as Inderst et al.
(2002) also find, favoring the ST firm. The cost difference between MD firms
and ST firms is typically larger for the P&C model than for the RS model,
mainly due to the larger cost of between-division fighting in the P&C model.
The cost difference is especially large when the between-division decisiveness
m is large and the within-division decisiveness m1 is small, which makes the
ST firm favorable even for the RS model.
Figure 13. MD firms versus ST firms: CP&C − CP&Cs and CRS − CRSs for various m and m1,
n1 = 5.
12. U Form Versus M Form of Economic Organization
Chandler (1966), Williamson (1975) and Inderst et al. (2002) analyze the
merits of the U form versus M form of economic organization. The U form
assumes K divisions or functions or groups such as manufacturing, marketing
and sales. Each division is subdivided into n products or brands or regions.
In contrast, the M form organizes products into divisions and functions into
subdivisions. The cost of fighting under the two organizational forms can be
determined. For the U form the cost is CP&C = K n[bF1(K , n)+cG1(K , n)] for
the P&C model. For the corresponding M form, obtained by interchanging K
and n in the expressions for F1 and G1 in Table 2, the cost is K n[bF1(n, K )+
cG1(n, K )]. The difference CP&CUM in cost between the U form and
M form is
CP&CUM = K n[bF1(K , n) + cG1(K , n) − bF1(n, K ) − cG1(n, K )]
= (K − n)K n[m(1 + (K − 1)(n − 1)m1) − m1]R[1 + (K − 1)m][1 + K (n − 1)m1][1 + (n − 1)m][1 + (K − 1)nm1] ,
(12.1)
which depends crucially on the sign of (K − n). For the RS model the corre-
sponding expression is
CRSUM = K n[b f1(K , n) + cg1(K , n) − b f1(n, K ) − cg1(n, K )]
= (n − K )[K nm1 + ((K − 1)(n − 1)m1 − K n)m]S
K 2n2
, (12.2)
which depends crucially on the sign of (n − K ). Figure 14 illustrates as a
function of K , for n = 5. The P&C model almost always gives preference for
Figure 14. U form versus M form: CP&CUM and CRSUM for various m and m1, n1 = 10.
the M form when K > n so that the firm has many functions K (divisions) and
few brands n (units within each division).19 The main reason is that within-
division fighting F1 decreases with 1/K , while between-division fighting
G1 increases marginally in K , toward a constant. Hence many divisions K
reduce the overall cost of fighting, which may explain the proliferation of
the M form with many divisions.The reverse is often the case for the RS
model, e.g.,m = m1 causes CRSUM to be negative when K > n, as Inderst
et al. (2002) also find,20 favoring the U form. Although both within-division
and between-division fighting f1 and g1 decrease with 1/K , both f1 and g1
decrease with 1/n2. Hence, few divisions K with many products n within each
division is often most cost-efficient. The exception, which is quite likely, is
when m1 is low and m is above a certain level, see Equation (12.2). Egalitarian
within-group distribution allows the number n of products to increase without
detrimental effects. In this case within-division fighting f1 is low anyway, and
increasing K is most cost efficient for K > n.
13. Conclusion
This article compares the production and conflict (P&C) model and the rent-
seeking (RS) model for agents in one group, two groups and K equally large 
groups. In the P&C model each agent allocates his resource between pro-
duction and fighting, and in the RS model each agent incurs a cost of rent-
seeking (fighting). The total production or rent is distributed within and 
between groups according to the within-group and between-group 
decisiveness. Both models distinguish between how much each agent fights 
within and between groups, and both productive and fighting efficiencies 
and group sizes play a role.
The second and third sections present the models. In the fourth section the
FOCs are determined and the models are compared for one group. Adding a
new agent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be
allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model. The collective action prob-
lem is more detrimental in the RS model. The utility decreases more severely
in group size in the RS model than in the P&C model, but both approach
zero. Increasing group size causes fighting to increase toward a constant in
the P&C model, enabled by concomitant production, and causes fighting to
decrease toward zero in the RS model, caused by the constraint of the rent.
Increasing the within-group decisiveness increases fighting asymptotically
toward a constant and decreases the utility asymptotically toward zero in the
P&C model, while these increases and decreases are linear in the RS model,
the latter eventually going negative.
The fifth section compares the models for two groups. The collective 
action problem is even more severe for the RS model, within-group fighting 
and utility decreasing more quickly toward zero as group size increases. As 
the group size increases, the ratio of within-group to between-group fighting 
realistically increases marginally toward a constant for the P&C model, 
while it increases convexly for the RS model, which causes unrealistically 
little between-group fighting. That no one takes on a noticeable burden of 
bringing home a ratio of the rent to his group in the RS model constitutes the 
biggest difference between the two models. One implication is that adding an 
additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in 
RS groups than in P&C groups, while adding a second group of agents when 
there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result.
The sixth section compares the models for K equally large groups, which
is analytically tractable. Within-group fighting decreases with 1/K for both
models. Between-group fighting increases marginally in K toward a constant,
and in the RS model decreases by 1/K . The severe between-group fighting
in the P&C model for many groups causes the P&C model to be preferable
for few groups, while the RS model is preferable for many groups.
Six applications are considered. For intergroup migration group sizes tend
to differ more in a P&C model than in a RS model, since agents leave a
productive group, and since a superior fighting efficiency is more influential
in a P&C model. Whereas inside ownership is unconditionally preferable over
outside ownership for the P&C model, contrasting Mu¨ller and Wa¨rneryd’s
(2001) result, for the RS model it is preferable when the within-group deci-
siveness is small and the between-group decisiveness is intermediate. Divesti-
ture is always preferable in the P&C model when the productive efficiencies
in the two groups are equal. For the RS model divestiture is justified with
comparable within-group decisiveness and sizes of the two divisions, but not
otherwise, but a large division size may compensate for a low within-group
decisiveness to justify divestiture. For mergers and acquisitions an agent in
firm 1 in the P&C model prefers the merger if the within-firm fighting after
the merger is indecisive or the between-firm fighting before the merger is
decisive. For the RS model an agent in firm 1 does not prefer the merger if the 
between-group decisiveness is above a minimum level, recalling that the cost 
of between-group fighting is low. The P&C model typically favors single-tier 
firms. In contrast, the RS model often favors multidivisional firms, except 
when the between-division decisiveness is large and the within-division 
decisiveness is low. The P&C model almost always gives preference for the 
M form when the firm has many functions K (divisions) and few brands n 
(units within each division). The reverse is often the case for the RS model, 
except, which is quite likely, when the within-division decisiveness is low 
and the between-division decisiveness is above a certain level.21
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Appendix A: Analyzing the Two-Group P&C Model
Setting the derivative of U1i in Equation (2.4) w.r.t. F1i equal to zero, assuming
identical agents in both groups so that F1i = F1 and F2i = F2 in equilibrium,
gives
∂U1i
∂ F1i
= 0 ⇒ (n1 − 1)m1
n21 F1
[
n1
R1 − b1 F1
a1
−
n1∑
i=1
c1G1i
a1
+ n2 R2 − b2 F2
a2
−
n2∑
i=1
c2G2i
a2
]
− b1
n1a1
= 0. (A1.1)
Similarly calculating ∂U2i/∂ F2i = 0, and equating the two equivalent square
brackets, gives
F1
F2
= (n1 − 1)n2a1b2m1(n2 − 1)n1a2b1m2
F1 = a1(n1 − 1)m1
n1b1
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
− ∑n1i=1 c1G1ia1 −
∑n2
i=1
c2G2i
a2
]
[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2] , (A1.2)
where F2 is found by permuting the indices. Inserting F1 and F2 into Equation
(2.4) and rearranging gives
U1i =
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
− ∑n1i=1 c1G1ia1 −
∑n2
i=1
c2G2i
a2
]( ∑n1
i=1 G1i
)m
n1[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]
[( ∑n1
i=1 G1i
)m + ( ∑n2i=1 G2i
)m] .
(A1.3)
Calculating the FOCs ∂U1i/∂G1i = 0 and ∂U2i/∂G2i = 0, equating the two
equivalent square brackets as above, and setting Gki = Gk and Uki = Uk gives
Table 1.
There are three corner solutions when m1 = m2 = mk, m, a1 = a2 = ak 
take extreme values. First, with extremely decisive within-group fighting 
(very large mk), the large Fk drives Ek and Gk in Equation (2.2) to zero 
causing Fk = Rk/bk and zero utility Uk = 0. Second, with extremely decisive 
between-group fighting (very large m), the large Gk gets constrained by Equa-
tion (2.2) to Gk = Rk/ck , causing Uk = 0. Third, with extremely high 
conversion cost ak of transforming resources Rk into productive effort Ek , 
agents in group k cease to produce (Ek = 0), and within-group and between-
group fighting get constrained by Equation (2.2) to Rk = bk Fk + ck Gk , where 
applying F1/G1 in Table 1 gives
F1 = ((c1a2)
m
m+1 + (c2a1) mm+1 )(n1 − 1)m1 R1
b1[((c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1 )(n1 − 1)m1 + m(c1a2) mm+1 [1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]]
.
G1 = m(c1a2)
m
m+1 [1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]R1
c1[((c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1 )(n1 − 1)m1 + m(c1a2) mm+1 [1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2]]
.
(A1.4)
Appendix B: Analyzing the K-Group P&C Model
Setting the derivative of U1i in Equation (2.5) w.r.t. F1i equal to zero, and
assuming identical agents in all groups so that F1i = F1 in equilibrium, gives
the FOC
∂U1i
∂ F1i
= 0 ⇒ (n − 1)m1
n2 F1
[
n
R − bF1
a
−
n∑
i=1
cG1i
a
+ (K − 1)n R − bF2
a
−(K − 1)
n∑
i=1
cG2i
a
]
− b
na
= 0. (A2.1)
Setting F1 = F2 in equilibrium and solving w.r.t. F1 gives
F1 = F2 = (n − 1)m1
nb
[
K n R − ∑ni=1 cG1i − (K − 1)ncG2
]
[1 + K (n − 1)m1] . (A2.2)
Inserting F1 = F2 into Equation (A2.1) and rearranging gives
U1i = 1
n
(∑ni=1 G1i )m
(∑ni=1 G1i )m + (K − 1)(nG2)m
× [K n R −
∑n
i=1 cG1i − (K − 1)ncG2]
a[1 + K (n − 1)m1] . (A2.3)
Calculating the FOC ∂U1i/∂G1i = 0, and setting G1i = G1 = G2 and
U1i = U1 gives the results shown in Table 2.
Appendix C: The Dynamic Extension of the Production and Conflict
Model
This section extends the conflict model dynamically, and more generally than
Reuveny and Maxwell (2001).22 Assume that the population in group k grows
according to
∂nk
∂t
= φknkUk − γknk, k = 1, 2, (A3.1)
where nkUk is the utility of group k given by Table 1, φk is a growth rate that
adjusts the growth of group k due to birth associated with the utility nkUk , and
γk is the death rate.23 The size of group k increases if the RHS in Equation
(A3.1) is positive, decreases if it is negative and is constant otherwise giving
a steady state solution. There are four possible corner steady state solutions,
i.e. (n1, n2) = (0, 0), (0, ∞), (∞, 0), (∞, ∞), and there may or may not exist
an internal steady state solution. For the latter, using Equation (A3.1) to solve
{∂n1/∂t = 0, ∂n2/∂t = 0} gives
n1
n2
= φ1γ2
φ2γ1
(
c2a1
c1a2
) m
m+1
. (A3.2)
The size of group 1 increases if ∂n1/∂t > 0, i.e.
φ1
[
n1 R1
a1
+ n2 R2
a2
](c2a1) mm+1
[1 + (n1 − 1)m1 + (n2 − 1)m2](m + 1)
[(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
]
− γ1n1 > 0. (A3.3)
When m1 = m2 = 0, inserting Equation (A3.2) into Equation (A3.3) 
eliminates n1 and n2 and Equation (A3.3) becomes
[
R1
a1
φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + R2
a2
φ2γ1(c1a2) mm+1
]
> γ1γ2(m + 1)
[
(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
]
. (A3.4)
Hence there is no internal solution, and the size n1 of group 1 increases to
infinity if the LHS is larger than the RHS in Equation (A3.4). This happens
when the resources R1 and R2 increase, the conversion costs a1and a2 of trans-
forming resources into productive effort decrease, the growth rates φ1 and φ2
increase, the death rates γ1 and γ2 decrease,and the between-group decisive-
ness m of fighting decreases. Without within-group fighting (m1 = m2 = 0)
there is nothing to constrain unlimited growth if the parameters are otherwise
beneficial. This is not the case with within-group fighting (m1 > 0 and/or
m2 > 0). Using Equations (A3.2) and (A3.3) gives the steady state solution
n1 =
[[ R1
a1
φ1γ2(c2a1)
m
m+1 + R2
a2
φ2γ1(c1a2)
m
m+1
]
γ1γ2(m+1)
[
(c1a2)
m
m+1 +(c2a1)
m
m+1
] + m1 + m2 − 1
]
φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1
m1φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + m2φ2γ1(c1a2) mm+1
,
(A3.5)
where Limm1→∞n1 = 1, which means that infinitely decisive fighting within
group 1 reduces the group size n1 to one agent. Permuting the indices or using
Equation (A3.2) gives the size n2 of group 2.
Contrary to Equation (A3.4) it is usually the case, also when m1 = m2 = 0,
that groups do not grow without bounds. One common mechanism of resource
adjustment is the logistic form
∂ R
∂t
= ξ (n1 + n2)R
[
1 − (n1 + n2)R
K
]
, (A3.6)
where ξ is the growth rate of the resource R, and K is the resource-carrying
capacity24. The steady state solution of Equation (A3.6) is R = K/(n1 + n2),
where the total size n1+n2 of the two groups grows until the resource-carrying
capacity K cannot sustain further growth. Hence for a given resource R for
each agent, there is a maximum number n1+n2 of agents that can be supported
by K . With R = R1 = R2, inserting R = K/(n1 + n2), Equation (A3.2) and
m1 = m2 = 0 in Equation (A3.5) gives
n1 =
Kφ1
[ 1
a1
φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + 1a2 φ2γ1(c1a2)
m
m+1
](c2a1) mm+1
γ1(m + 1)
[
φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + φ2γ1(c1a2) mm+1
][(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
] .
(A3.7)
Assuming within-group fighting (m1 > 0 and/or m2 > 0), inserting
R = K/(n1 + n2) and Equation (A3.2) into Equation (A3.5) gives a second
order equation with solution
n1 =
−1 + m1 + m2 +
√
(1 − m1 − m2)2 + 4
[
m1φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + m2φ2γ1(c1a2) mm+1
]
H
2
[
m1φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + m2φ2γ1(c1a2) mm+1
]
× φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 ,
H = K
[ 1
a1
φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + 1a2 φ2γ1(c1a2)
m
m+1
]
γ1γ2(m + 1)
[
φ1γ2(c2a1) mm+1 + φ2γ1(c1a2) mm+1
][(c1a2) mm+1 + (c2a1) mm+1
] . (A3.8)
where the size n2 of group 2 is found by permuting the indices.
A characteristic of Equation (A3.1) is that no agents are killed.25 For
killing to be present in a dynamic model, the size of the other group has to
be present on the RHS with a negative sign, causing direct reduction in group
size. The classical example is Lanchester (1916) square warfare, dn1/dt = −
µ1n2, dn2/dt = − µ2n1, where µk is the combat effectiveness coefficient,
and the loss rate of one group is proportional to the size of the other group.26
Although the size n2 of group 2 is not present with a negative sign in the
expression for U1 in Equation (2.4), and thus not present on the RHS of
Equation (A3.1), group 2 can cause a significant reduction in U1 over time.
If U1 decreases sufficiently so that the RHS in Equation (A3.1) becomes and
stays negative, group 1 eventually goes extinct, due to the death rate. Summing
up, without within-group fighting and without resource constraints, a group
either grows to infinite size or goes extinct. Within-group fighting prevents
infinite growth, and infinitely decisive within-group fighting reduces the group
size to one. Logistic resource growth places additional limitations on group
growth. The dynamic model is such that agents may lose their production
and property but not their life, in contrast to Lanchester war models and
evolutionary biology models.
Notes
1. Anderton, Anderton and Carter (1999), Cothren (2000), Grossman (1991), Grossman and
Kim (1995, 2000), Hausken (2000a,b, 2004), Hirshleifer (1991, 1995a, 2000, 2001), Neary
(1997), Noh (1998), Reuveny and Maxwell (2001), Rider (1993, 1999), Skaperdas (1992),
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997, 2001), Usher (1987, 1992), Usher and Engineer (1987).
2. Baik and Lee (1997), Baik and Shogren (1995), Hausken (1995a,b, 1998), Katz et al.
(1990), Lee (1995), Mu¨ller and Wa¨rneryd (2001), Nitzan (1991a,b, 1994) and Rapoport
and Amaldoss (1999).
3. The term “fighting” is to be understood as a metaphor. As Hirshleifer (1995a:28) puts it,
“falling also into the category of interference struggles are political campaigns, rent-seeking
maneuvers for licenses and monopoly privileges (Tullock, 1967), commercial efforts to
raise rivals costs (Salop and Scheffman,1983), strikes and lockouts, and litigation all being
conflictual activities that need not involve actual violence.” Fighting is a subcategory of
competition. We prefer to use the narrower and therefore more precise word fighting, which
can be substituted with synonyms such as struggle, conflict, battle, etc.
4. This amounts to inserting h = 1 in Hirshleifer’s production function (Hirshleifer,
1995a:31).
5. This paper assumes no interaction between resources devoted to within-group and between-
group fighting, which we believe is superior to treating the two levels of conflict as one.
Partial interaction is difficult to handle analytically. Modifications are necessary to analyze
cases where an agent’s investment in personal fighting power may be used to help the group
in fighting with the other group, or hurt the group by internal predation.
6. This assumption, caused by a need for simplicity and analytical tractability, is often realistic,
but not always.
7. The sequencing of the two fights is not essential. The same result follows if ∂U1i/∂ F1i = 0
and ∂U2i/∂ F2i = 0 are calculated first, and thereafter ∂U1i/∂G1i = 0 and ∂U2i/∂G2i = 0,
or vice versa.
8. Jack Hirshleifer (private communication) has suggested that a P&C model can be used to
analyze RS problems. Imagine that the consumption good X can be produced as usual. But
if agents attempt to acquire X in a predatory way, a special set of circumstances apply. To
wit, there is an extra exogenous prize in a fixed amount x*, also in units of X. Agents then
trade off between producing X themselves, or engaging in rent-seeking to increase their
share of x*, or to increase their probability of winning if it is an all-or- nothing game.
9. R1 is a constant in the P&C model and is not common to subtract to determine the utility Ui .
The tradeoff in the optimization is between choosing a large Fi to get a large share of the
total production, and a small Fi to ensure high production. In contrast, ri is a variable cost
in the RS model, and since there is no production, ri needs to be subtracted to determine
the utility ui . The tradeoff in the optimization is between choosing a large fi to get a large
share of the rent S, and a small fi to ensure a low cost ri of rent-seeking. The rent S is
fully dissipated by rent-seeking when m1 ≥ n1/(n1 − 1).
10. The asymptote for un1+1/un1 is caused by the utilities turning negative as m1 increases.
11. The large G1 is also consistent with findings in the production and conflict literature, where
Hausken (2000b) shows the benefit of moving to a more appropriative and less productive
group and appropriate goods produced by the most productive group.
12. The absolute values of n1 and n2 follow trivially using n1 + n2 = N .
13. An alternative is
∑2
k=1 nk(Fk + Gk), measuring costs in “effort exerted” rather than “re-
sources expended.”
14. We interpret v(n2) = A2 for n = n2 in their notation.
15. With comparable groups sizes two divisions may coexist beneficially if the division with
(in)decisive within-group fighting mk has low (high) between-group fighting eficiency
1/ck , which is mutually beneficial.
16. Indecisive between-group fighting (m = 0) causes a stricter requirement to m1 to ensure
the merger than decisive between-group fighting (m = 1). If the denominator in Equation
(8.1) is negative, which happens when m is large, an agent in group 1 always prefers the
merger.
17. Most mergers are beneficial for the P&C model, except e.g. merging a large group n2 = 10
with beneficial m2 = 0.5 into a small group n1 = 5 with high m1. Group 1 would then
suffer more from being three times as large than from the between-group fighting when
nonmerged. Most mergers are not beneficial for the RS model, except e.g. merging a small
group n2 = 5 with beneficial m2 = 0.5 into a large group n1 = 10 with low m1. Group 2
gets too large a ratio of the rent when nonmerged, to the dissatisfaction of group 1.
18. Hausken (2002b) analyzes mergers of K firms with a RS model.
19. A rare exception is when K and n and m are unreasonably high and m1 is unreasonably
low.
20. ln their notation this is verified by inserting m = m1 = γ, K = A, B = n into their last
unnumbered equation before Proposition 4.
21. I thank Jack Hirshleifer for most of the insights that follow in this footnote. Especially in
connection with the applications, a distinction between “fighting” and “arming” in future
work may turn out to be important. Classical contributions are by Lanchester (1916) for
war and Richardson (1939) for armament. Most studies that make the distinction tend to
concentrate on arming, except Hirshleifer (1995b: Section 6) and Grossman (2003). In
dealing with the two different “regimes”, under “armed peace” (low-intensity conflict)
there is no actual fighting (no battle destruction, no conquest, etc.), while under “fighting”
or “war” (high-intensity conflict) these effects do occur combined with a choice of how
much resources to devote to conflict. Within each regime, decisions are made “in the
shadow of” a reversion to the other regime. E.g., peacetime arms expenditures may reduce
the cost of mobilizing forces in wartime, and wartime efforts may be aimed at securing
better terms of peace. A difficult analytic challenge is what determines these reversions or
transitions, i.e. when do fighting and or arming begin and end.
22. They abstract from the within-group collective action problem, which in our model means
setting m1 = m2 = 0, and they let each group allocate between harvesting effort from a
common resource stock and conflict effort. Although the models are built up differently,
with different interpretations of the parameters, it turns out to be possible through five
assumptions to make the expression for U1 in Table 1, multiplied by the number n1 of
agents in group 1, equivalent to Reuveny and Maxwell’s Equation (14) (Reuveny and
Maxwell, 2001). First we assume no within-group fighting, i.e. m1 = m2 = 0. Second,
we interpret the unit conversion cost ck of transforming resources into fighting effort to be
the inverse of Reuveny and Maxwell’s “efficiency of conflict effort” αk , that is ck = 1/αk
(Reuveny and Maxwell, 2001:724). Third, we interpret the unit conversion cost ak of
transforming resources into productive effort to be the inverse of Reuveny and Maxwell’s
“efficiency of harvesting” β, and equivalent for both groups, that is a1 = a2 = 1/β. Fourth,
we interpret each agent’s resource Rk as equivalent to Reuveny and Maxwell’s “resource
stock” R, and equivalent for both groups, that is R1 = R2 = R. Fifth, we set the between-
group decisiveness m = 1. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001:732) eventually introduce m for
the case that α1 = α2, obtaining a factor m + 1 in the denominator which corresponds to
m + 1 in the denominator in U1 in Table 1.
23. Mathematically, φk corresponds to Reuveny and Maxwell’s φ and γk corresponds to −ε,
where Reuveny and Maxwell (2001:726) define  as “the difference between natural birth
rate and death rate.” (The population biology literature is variable regarding positive and
negative signs.) Care should be exercised when setting up differential equations, or time-
dependent equations of motion, to avoid that the static optimization loses validity. We are
thus reluctant to include more than these two terms on the RHS of Equation (A3.1).
24. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001:726) also assume logistic growth, but deduct harvest.
25. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001:735) apply their model to Easter Island and argue with
references that “the loser in the conflict often lost his property but not his life”.
26. See Hausken (1995b) and Hausken and Moxnes (2002) for recent work on Lanchester
warfare. A second example is Lanchester (1916) linear warfare expressed as dn1/dt = −
µ1n2n1, dn2/dt = −µ2n1n2. A third example is competitive exclusion in population biol-
ogy, expressed as dn1/dt = α1n1 − β1n21 − X1n1n2, dn2/dt = α2n2 − β2n22 − X2n1n2,
where αk, βk,Xk are coefficients. A fourth example is the predator – prey system
dn1/dt = α1n1 − β1n1n2, dn2/dt = − α2n2 + β2n1n2, where group 1 is the prey and
group 2 the predator. In general, arbitrarily complex expressions can be built up on the
RHS for the case under scrutiny. See Braun (1983) for further examples.
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